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The last two and a half years have seen the biggest change of Britain’s European policy in its
four-decade membership of the European Union. In the first of a series of blogs on EU
institutions and their history, Anthony Teasdale argues that, whereas the development of a
two-speed or two-tier Europe was once a situation  the UK sought to avoid at all costs, it now
seems to be tolerated, if not promoted, by the British government. The country risks being left
as an ‘outsider looking in’ on EU decision-making. The inability of the country to recognise the
dangers of this situation reflects a wider British ‘Eurosis’ about the sovereignty-sharing that lies
at the heart of the Union process.
For most of  its f orty-year membership of  the European Union, Britain has f ought to avoid being ‘on the
outside looking in’, as Peter Jenkins characterised the prospect in a powerf ul article written during the June
1989 European elections. Reacting to Margaret Thatcher ’s ‘Diet of  Brussels’ advertising campaign, Jenkins
saw the United Kingdom drif t ing away f rom the European mainstream in the f ace of  pressure f or Economic
and Monetary Union and a social Europe.
Almost a quarter of  a century later, it is now clear that, f rom the June 1975 ref erendum until the end of  the
Cold War, successive Brit ish governments largely succeeded in riding the twin horses of  European
integration and domestic public scepticism towards continental entanglements. Although Britain f ailed to
join the European Monetary System (EMS) in January 1979, the notion of  a ‘variable geometry’ or à la carte
Europe was long f rowned upon in both London and in Brussels – being seen as strategically
disadvantageous in one capital and as anti-communautaire in the other.
Ironic as it now seems, the
Conservatives in opposition even
chastised the Callaghan government
f or its ‘obstructive and malevolent
attitude’ in staying outside the EMS.
Mrs Thatcher described Britain’s non-
participation as ‘a sad day f or Europe’.
From 1985, the new European
Commission President, Jacques
Delors, resisted pressure to sanction
a ‘two-speed’ Europe. The prevailing
philosophy remained that all member
states should, wherever possible,
move f orward together towards the
same goal, even if  it  meant
progressing at the speed of  the
slowest. Britain of ten exploited this
situation, rather like car driving as slowly as possible down the f ast lane of  a motorway, ref using to move
over, leaving others behind f lashing their lights in irritation.
Maastricht moment
The Maastricht settlement in December 1991 marked the moment that the UK-EU relationship f irst shif ted
towards a serious f orm of  dif f erentiated integration. The Commission reluctantly accepted Brit ish opt-outs
on EMU, social policy and justice and home af f airs (JHA) – which in turn were hailed in London as major
negotiating successes. A pattern was set: even if  Tony Blair closed the social chapter opt-out, Labour in
power deepened the JHA opt-out and secured a partial exemption f rom the Charter of  Fundamental Rights.
Nevertheless, throughout the long years f rom Maastricht to the 2010 general election, there was a solid
determination in Downing Street to try to keep Britain at the top table of  EU decision-making. Messrs Major
and Blair both described a two-speed or two-tier Europe as unacceptable. At Ellesmere Port in May 1994,
Mr Major f lirted with the idea of  a ‘multi-speed’ or ‘multi- t ier ’ Europe, but only so long as the UK was not
excluded f rom any kind of  settled inner core.
Overall, in the 1990s and 2000s, Britain wanted the opposite of  the EEA states: to exercise polit ical
maximum power f rom within the club, whilst exempting itself  f rom rules it f ound inconvenient. During his
premiership, Gordon Brown managed to ensure that Britain participated in the f irst eurozone summits, and
even inf luenced their conclusions, without making any commitment to join the single currency. He was
determined not to repeat his own mistake as Chancellor of  casual indif f erence to the emergence of  the
Eurogroup of  eurozone f inance ministers.
Strategic shift
The Conservatives’ relationship with the EPP Group in the European Parliament represented, in
microcosmic f orm, an apotheosis of  this UK approach. Tory MEPs served as EPP Group spokesmen on
many key legislative committees – including environment, single market and employment – but equally
enjoyed complete f reedom to diverge f rom a group whip that they played a disproportionate role in shaping.
The decision by David Cameron to f orce the Conservatives out of  the EPP Group in July 2009 was thus
more than just, as many assumed at the time, a marginal sop to Eurosceptics: it was an important early
indicator of  what was to become a major strategic shif t in Britain’s European policy.
The last two and a half  years have in f act seen the biggest single change of  government policy on EU
issues in the history of  Brit ish membership. From almost his f irst day in of f ice, the Prime Minister indicated
he would not attend eurozone summits, much to the chagrin of  Angela Merkel and the disappointment of
many in the City. His government said that ‘closer integration was f or the eurozone only’ and passed an Act
of  Parliament, the 2011 European Union Act, that requires ref erenda f or any signif icant transf ers of  power
to European level. Fear of  the need f or parliamentary approval to an EU treaty change applying only to the
eurozone resulted in his vetoing this route in December 2011: the intergovernmental Fiscal Compact Treaty
was the result. Mr Cameron assumed that he could lead a coalit ion of  the ‘outs’, but in practice eight of  the
ten non-eurozone countries, nearly all seeing themselves as ‘pre- ins’, quickly signed up to the new treaty
anyway.
Outsider looking in 
The Cameron policy on Europe combines the ‘opt-out mentality of  an opt-out government’, as Tony Blair
f amously described his predecessor ’s approach to policy exemptions in the 1990s, with a new and
unprecedented willingness to tolerate the UK’s non- involvement in key decision-making structures. Crit ically,
the idea of  a two-speed or two-tier Europe, with the UK located in an outer grouping, however small, is no
longer anathema. Indeed, the ‘inexorable logic’ of  eurozone integration is accepted as likely to transf orm
Britain’s relationship into that of  an outsider looking in on the real polit ics and power of  a deepening and
widening eurozone core. The main preoccupation is to try to ring-f ence that process and contain any spill-
over f rom the core to the (polit ical) periphery of  the Union.
Perhaps to make the reality of  marginalisation less painf ul f or Britain, the Prime Minister would pref er the
EU as a whole to evolve towards a complex variable-geometry system, in which the central obligations of
membership are minimised f or everyone. If  this change cannot be achieved, the UK alone should be given a
wide range of  new, additional, country-specif ic opt-outs. Back in May 1999, William Hague as opposition
leader already f oreshadowed this concept in his now largely- f orgotten Budapest speech – interestingly
written by George Osborne – when he proposed that common EU policies, backed by supranational law
binding on all, should essentially be limited to three areas: the single market, competit ion policy and external
trade. Everywhere else, there could be a ‘mix and match’ Europe. Today, it is argued, this f ormula should be
allowed to apply to Britain on its own, even if  everyone else were to shun it.
For the f irst t ime since Harold Wilson in October 1974, Britain has a Prime Minister who no longer def ends
the terms on which the country belongs to the European Union. The f act that a signif icant majority of  the
current House of  Commons almost certainly can support continued membership on these terms seems
strangely immaterial. Whereas Mr Wilson planned to resolve this problem with a largely cosmetic
renegotiation, f ollowed by a ref erendum within nine months, Mr Cameron looks to a much more radical
ref ormatting of  the UK-EU relationship in f our years’ t ime.
Setting aside whether the Prime Minister can actually negotiate the outcome he wants – and what other
countries might seek to extract in return – this situation reveals a striking f ailure by pro-Europeans in
Britain to win acceptance f or the key notions that most governing elites on the continent largely take f or
granted – notably, the idea of  a European ‘destiny shared in common’, as Robert Schuman put it in May
1950, based on sovereignty-sharing in many areas of  policy.
Eurosis
Whether because of  the Westminster-centric nature of  Britain’s national institutions, the media’s
indif f erence to polit ical lif e outside SW1, or the triumph of  the English language and of  Anglo-Saxon
thinking in global discourse, a basic neurosis about Europe still exists at the heart of  Brit ish polit ics and
culture, and it shows no sign of  abating. The consequences of  this ‘Eurosis’ are now becoming much more
acute, exacerbated by the seeming impossibility of  the Conservative party ever reconciling itself  to the true
nature of  European integration.
One is reminded of  what John Connally, President Nixon’s Treasury Secretary, is alleged to have said when
the United States broke the link between the dollar and gold in 1971: ‘the President has a problem and he
wants to share it with his f riends’. Af ter being held in check, but lef t unresolved, during the Blair-Brown
years, Britain’s European problem is now back with a vengeance. It has recently been shared by the Prime
Minister with our f riends on the continent and has now become Europe’s Brit ish problem too.
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